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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         In this inverse condemnation action, 287 Corporate 
Center Associates ("Associates") sued the Township of Bridgewater 
("Township") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution for allegedly taking its property 
without just compensation.  The district court dismissed the case 
as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.  
Associates has appealed.  We will affirm. 
                               I. 
         The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291.  Our review is plenary.  See Nelson v. County of 
Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 1266 (1996). 
                              II. 
         Associates owns a piece of property (Lot l2) in 
Bridgewater Township, New Jersey.  Lot l2 is a 39 acre tract 
split-zoned into two categories:  approximately one half is zoned 
single family residential; the remainder is zoned for office and 
service facilities.  After various proposals to develop Lot l2, 
Associates entered into a developer's agreement with the township 
planners.   
         Associates contends that under the developer's 
agreement and the Township's zoning scheme, it has been unable to 
develop its property.  Specifically, Associates asserts it was 
forced to accept conditions as part of the developer's agreement 
which restricted the lot from being developed and foreclosed 
proper access to the site.  Associates also contends the dual 
zoning designation prevented Lot l2 from being developed in 
accordance with either the residential or the commercial zoning 
ordinance.   
         Associates brought an inverse condemnation suit against 
the Township under 42 U.S.C. § l983 and the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  The complaint alleged both a 
regulatory taking and a physical taking, and it sought damages or 
in the alternative an injunction directing the Township to zone 
the entire Lot l2 "commercial" and permit reasonable access to 
the property.  The facts alleged in the complaint occurred 
between 1981 and 1985, but suit was not filed until August 2, 
1994.  The Township filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as 
time-barred under New Jersey's two year statute of limitations 
for personal injury actions.  The district court granted the 
motion to dismiss and Associates appeals, contending 
alternatively its claims should be exempt from any statute of 
limitations or subject to a limitations period of six or twenty 
years.  Associates also contends that, regardless of which 
statute of limitations applies, the limitations period has not 
yet expired. 
                              III. 
A.       No Exemption from the Statute of Limitations 
         Associates argues that actions to recover just 
compensation for the taking of property should not be restricted 
by the application of a statute of limitations.  In its brief, 
Associates asserts, "[T]he legislature has placed the burden on 
the defendant to acquire the property it needs through 
condemnation.  Because this action is brought about as a result 
of the defendant's failure to use its eminent domain powers, it 
would be unjust to allow the defendant to circumvent its 
obligation to make compensation by raising the statute of 
limitations."  (Appellant's Br. at 14.)   
         We agree with Associates that the standard mode of 
taking is through a sovereign's use of its eminent domain powers.  
But when, as would be customary in an inverse condemnation suit, 
it is alleged that a governmental body has effectuated a taking 
without recourse to eminent domain proceedings, "[s]uch a taking 
. . . shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the 
encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just 
compensation."  United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 
(1980).  We see no reason why shouldering that burden does not 
carry with it the obligation to initiate suit within the time 
specified by the appropriate statute of limitations.   
Associates' argument, therefore, lacks merit. 
         Associates also contends the policy underlying statutes 
of limitations is not advanced by its application to inverse 
condemnation actions.  But federal causes of action are subject 
to time limitations.  "A federal cause of action `brought at any 
distance of time' would be `utterly repugnant to the genius of 
our laws.'"  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (quoting 
Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805)). 
B.       The Applicable Statute of Limitations  
         Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor the Fifth Amendment 
contains a limitations period.  When Congress has not established 
a time limitation for a federal cause of action, we must look to 
the most "appropriate" or "analogous" state statute of 
limitations.  Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. 
         1.   42 U.S.C. § 1983 
         In Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court determined that 
the most appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is 
the state personal injury statute.  See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276.  
Accordingly, the district court applied New Jersey's two year 
personal injury statute to Associates' § 1983 claim and dismissed 
it as time-barred.  Associates asserts its cause of action is not 
analogous to the one in Wilson.  But the directive in Wilson is 
clear.  The Court recognized that not all § 1983 claims fit 
perfectly within the "personal injury" category, but found 
nonetheless that "a simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 
claims best fits the statute's remedial purpose."  Id. at 272.  
See also Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 843 (3d 
Cir.) ("[A] uniform time limit for all § 1983 actions -- 
regardless of the nature of the precise claim -- must be applied 
. . . ."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).  Therefore, we will 
affirm the district court's application of New Jersey's two year 
statute of limitations to Associate's § 1983 action.  See, e.g., 
McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(applying personal injury statute of limitations to § 1983 action 
for inverse condemnation), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987). 
         2.   Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
         Associates also brought suit under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Following Wilson v. Garcia, some Courts of Appeals, 
for purposes of consistency, have applied the personal injury 
statute of limitations to actions brought directly under the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 
463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1988) (action brought directly under 5th 
Amendment), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); Chin v. Bowen, 
833 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1987) (action brought directly under 14th 
Amendment).   
         Associates contends, however, that we should ignore  
Wilson and instead apply the most analogous state statute of 
limitations.  Associates argues for the application of New 
Jersey's twenty year statute of limitations, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:14-7, which provides, "Every action at law for real estate 
shall be commenced within 20 years next after the right or title 
thereto, or cause of such action shall have accrued."  But in New 
Jersey, the most analogous state statute provides a six year 
limitations period.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.  Although 
the statute does not explicitly reference inverse condemnation 
actions, New Jersey decisional law indicates it is the proper 
statute of limitations in such cases.  See, e.g., Russo Farms, 
Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 655 A.2d 447, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1995) (applying six year statute of limitations to 
inverse condemnation action), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
675 A.2d 1077 (N.J. 1996) (issue not raised on appeal); Harisadan 
v. City of East Orange, 453 A.2d 888, 890 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1982) (applying six year statute of limitations to inverse 
condemnation action).  Therefore, regardless of which approach we 
take, at most this claim is subject to a six year statute of 
limitations. 
         The facts underlying the alleged taking occurred 
between 1981 and 1985.  Associates did not file suit until  
August 2, 1994, well after the time limit under both the two year 
and six year statutes of limitations.   
C.       The Limitations Period Has Expired 
         1.   This is Not a Continuing Wrong 
         Associates contends the taking of its property amounts 
to a "continuing wrong," which effectively tolls the statute of 
limitations.  We have held that under proper circumstances, the 
"continuing wrong" doctrine may apply: 
         In most federal causes of action, when a 
         defendant's conduct is part of a continuing 
         practice, an action is timely so long as the 
         last act evidencing the continuing practice 
         falls within the limitations period . . . . 
 
Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joinders of 
Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991).  The focus is on the 
defendant's "affirmative[] act[s]."  Id. at 1296.   
         The Township has not committed an affirmative act since 
1985.  The facts of the alleged taking stabilized almost ten 
years before Associates filed its lawsuit.  Associates is unable 
to allege facts which might bring it under the "continuing wrong" 
doctrine.  See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 
(1947) (holding that a landowner may "postpon[e] suit until the 
situation becomes stabilized.").  
         2.   Associates' Cause of Action was Not Created by 
              Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
              1003 (1992). 
 
         Associates claims its cause of action did not exist, 
and the limitations period did not start to run, until the 
Supreme Court held in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992), that a taking occurs when government 
regulation denies a property owner of all economically viable use 
of his property.  But the court in Lucas emphasized there was 
nothing new to its finding that a taking occurs "where regulation 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."  
Id. at 1015 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 
(1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981)).  Where a decision of 
the Court applies a rule that the Court has already set forth on 
"numerous occasions," Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016, that decision 
cannot be said to create any new causes of action.  Therefore, 
this argument fails as well.  
         3.   Equitable Tolling 
         Associates asserts its equitable defenses to the 
Township's timeliness argument should preclude dismissal on the 
pleadings.  Associates never raised this issue before the 
district court.  Rather it raised the "equitable tolling" theory 
for the first time in its appellate brief.  Ordinarily we will 
not consider allegations initially raised on appeal.  See McCray 
v. Corry Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 224, 226 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995).   
         In any event, equitable tolling does not apply here.  
There are no allegations, at least from 1985 on, the Township 
"actively misled" Associates into forgoing prompt action to 
vindicate its rights.  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & 
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994).   
                         IV.  Conclusion 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
